Coherentists can then maintain that speakers can only make a practice of asserting a proposition under conditions the speakers are able to recognise as justifying the proposition.
As it has been said: "Sorensen does not offer a definition of asserting a proposition (with necessary and sufficient conditions)… To the extent that he does not fully analyze the concept of assertion, Sorensen's definition of lying is unclear" (Carson 2010, 36).
In the right circumstances, a speaker could use (26) to assert a true proposition.
However, according to some views of this sort, a speaker who utters that sentence typically asserts a full proposition, such as the proposition that George is rich for a philosopher.
If, within a world, two individuals assert exactly the same propositions, then they are exactly alike vis-à-vis having asserted a true proposition: the one asserted at least one true proposition if and only if the other did.
However, a speaker who utters such a sentence typically asserts a full proposition that completes the propositional radical that the sentence semantically expresses.
It is thus possible for two individuals in different worlds to assert exactly the same propositions, and yet differ with respect to having asserted a true proposition.
The following weak supervenience thesis thus holds: for any world w, and any individuals x and y in w, if x and y are indiscernible with respect to what propositions they have asserted, then they are indiscernible with respect to having asserted a true proposition.
It works this way: assert that a proposition is true because it hasn't been proven false yet.
