The Cartesian that takes the intentionality aspect of thought the farthest is Robert Desgabets.
Spirit is rather a distinguishable aspect of thought, generated in activity, and may be viewed more as a relational property.
Also, biosemantics is just one of a number of related philosophic programs that endeavor to use scientific concepts and principles to explain the representational aspect of thought.
For the naturalist to meet Brentano's challenge, she must show that this peculiar aspect of thought is not so puzzling after all.
So while the biosemantic program insists that science (biology) has a crucial role to play in explaining an aspect of thought and thereby helps to build the case for scientific naturalism, it is also comparatively modest.
In other words, it is scientific naturalists and scientifically naturalistic philosophers of mind who are most inclined to see this representational aspect of thought as a problem, and who are especially concerned to solve that problem.3.
Consequently, of considerable interest is, for example, "the question of how the narrative aspect of thought experiments have implications for the process whereby one version of a thought experiment can spawn another" (Souder, 2003, pp. 208 209).
It also allows to bring an aspect of thought experiments in focus that has been widely neglected in the discussion so far: the bodily component of (thought) experimenting (Gooding, 1993).
Alternative accounts might aim to account for the representational aspect of thought by invoking only such concepts and principles as are afforded by physics (e.g., cause and effect) without making use of the additional higher-level concepts and principles that are afforded by biology (e.g., trait, selection, fitness, and so forth).
