The phrase "argument patterns" is correct and usable in written English.
It can be used in contexts related to logic, reasoning, or discussions about the structure of arguments.
Example: "In our debate class, we analyzed various argument patterns to understand how to construct persuasive arguments effectively."
Alternatives: "argument structures" or "argument frameworks".
Under the heading more and less and likewise, Aristotle groups a somewhat motley assortment of argument patterns all involving, in some way or other, the terms "more", "less", and "likewise".
Following Kitcher, let us define the explanatory store $E(K)$ as the set of argument patterns that maximally unifies $K$, the set of beliefs accepted at a particular time in science.
Logic as a discipline starts with the transition from the more or less unreflective use of logical methods and argument patterns to the reflection on and inquiry into these and their elements, including the syntax and semantics of sentences.
Thus, many argue that we think of that-clauses as designating expressions if we are to explain how certain argument patterns (such as those considered in Section 2) are valid and in fact have sound instances (Horwich 1990, Higginbotham 1991, Schiffer 1996, Bealer 1998).
Since the OD pattern already permits the derivation of all facts about the dimensions of objects, the addition of the shadow pattern $S$ to $P$ will increase the number of argument patterns in $P$ and will not allow us to derive any new conclusions.
The Rhetoric does fit this general description: Aristotle includes both discussions of types of person or audience (with generalizations about what each type tends to believe) and a summary version (in II.23) of the argument patterns discussed in the Topics.
For example, TAPping into argumentation: Developments in the application of Toulmin's argument pattern for studying science discourse (Erduran et al. 2004) published in SE provided a method for analysing argumentation that was widely used by science education researchers afterwards.
A simplified version of Toulmin's Argument Pattern (1958) has been used as a guiding model to investigate the written arguments.
To perform this construction, we employ previous work towards automatically allocating DALs to such a model and combining it with an appropriate safety argument pattern.
Some philosophers have attempted to portray, and justify, analogical reasoning in terms of some simpler inductive argument pattern.
The more restrictions an argument pattern imposes on the arguments that instantiate it, the more stringent it is said to be.
