Sentence examples for argument for the principles from inspiring English sources

(2) The argument from the social bases of self-respect: The publicity condition is also crucial to Rawls' fourth argument for the principles of justice, from the social bases of self-respect (TJ, 178 82/155 59 rev).

In any case, Lewis thinks that where that sense is lacking, argument for the principles is pointless, and he concludes AKV by claiming that "valuation is always a matter of empirical knowledge" but "what is right and what is just can never be determined by empirical facts alone" (Lewis 1946, 554).

(Leitgeb & Pettigrew 2010b also present a condition that allows them to give a gradational accuracy argument for the principle of indifference).

Tom L. Beauchamp and Alexander Rosenberg (1981) neglect the circularity argument and maintain, following Kemp Smith (1941), that Hume is a skeptic only concerning the use of a priori reason in causal inferences: Hume merely intends to show that there is no demonstrative argument for the principle of the uniformity of nature.

We believe, contrary to non-skeptical interpretations like Garrett's (note 5 above), that Hume's appeal to circularity here is normative or justificatory: Hume is saying that a circular argument for the principle of the uniformity of nature is simply begging the question and, as such, it is a fallacious argument not simply one that happens to be causally inefficacious.

Now turn to the arguments for the principles of justice in the original position.

Now that the arguments for the principles of justice have been outlined, this is a good place to consider the objection that the original position is not necessary or even morally relevant.

So it is not sufficient to point to the accuracy argument for that principle in the way we did in response to the coherentist.

Even if this policy never gets adopted, debating the alternatives will provide Labour with a clearer set of positive arguments for the principle itself.

give rather different accuracy-based arguments for the Principle of Indifference, which says how a rational agent with no evidence will distribute their credences.

The Dutch Strategy arguments for the Principle of Conditionalization and for Jeffrey's Rule do not fully support the norms, but only the weaker claim that one should not commit in advance to following an alternative rule, and the sense in which it may be said to be inconsistent to do so seems different from what is involved in violating the axioms.