The phrase "are really identical" is correct and usable in written English.
It can be used when emphasizing that two or more things are the same in every significant way.
Example: "The two designs are really identical, with no noticeable differences between them."
Alternatives: "are truly the same" or "are completely alike".
Thus, when Paul affirms that essence and being are really identical and formally different, he simply restates the thesis of the real identity and formal distinction between universals and individuals that was typical of the Realists of the late Middle Ages.
As already noted, for Godfrey essence and existence are really identical and only differ conceptually.
According to the Oxford Realists, universals and individuals are really identical but formally distinct.
According to a second view they are really identical, but differ intentionally.
Finally, a third position, which Godfrey himself embraces, maintains that they are really identical and differ only conceptually.
(In Scotist terms one might say that the proposition that Socrates is wise and the fact that Socrates is wise are really identical but formally distinct).
General names in the category of substance are concrete terms as well, but the form they primarily signify is really identical to the substances they name.
Or is he closer to Averroës, regarding the particular individual as the underlying reality, which, viewed in abstraction from causal connections, is really identical with its own essence?
On the other hand, the specific difference is really identical with the genus, from which it is distinct only in virtue of a formal principle.
General names in the category of substance are concrete terms as well, but the form they primarily signify is really identical with the substances they label.
He comments that either essence is really identical with existence and differs from it (1) only conceptually or (2) intentionally, or else (3) existence is a distinct thing, i.e., the act of the essence and really distinct from it (PB 2.60).
