Taken together, the second and third premises show that broad content cannot fulfill this role.
For example, we might try reading the second and third premises uniformly, either on the model of (2′) or on the model of (3′).
In virtue of condition (F), the argument with premises K′ and conclusion X′ must be an argument where it is not the case that the premises are true and the conclusion false; and that's in fact the case: the first premise is false, and the second premise and the conclusion are true.
(These authors accept the first premise of both versions of the argument and the second premise of the first version as well, but they deny the second premise of the second version and insist that (2a) does not imply (2b)).
Then the second premises, B2 and C2, are both true on the modal entailment account.
To obtain the conclusion, we must first deduce Ti → E i by specification from the second premise and then use modus ponens with the first.
One response for the anti-physicalist is to reject the second premise and to adopt a version of what is called epiphenomenalism, the view that mental events are caused by, and yet do not cause, physical events.
The argument is clearly related to arguments from practicality against rationalism (see the Anti-Rationalism Supplement), but the second premise and the conclusion are about moral judgments themselves rather than about the processes that result in moral judgment.
Note that this allows Fischer and Ravizza to reject the second premise in the formulation of the manipulation argument as set out above (in the introduction), which contends that an agent so manipulated is no different in any relevant respect from an agent caused to be in such a state due to a normal deterministic history.
In a later essay (Fodor 1991), Fodor defends a weaker and more complicated version of the second premise.
