Nothing can be an object of experience unless it is experienced as having causes and effects.
How to look at it in that way — winkling out "gender issues" with a rooting interest in their resolution — and simultaneously as art, an object of experience in and of itself, is not addressed.
Error, which consists of what "our judgment adds" to the evidence, can be of two types, one relative to what is not an object of experience, the other relative to what is such an object but for which the evidence is dubious.
The task of criticism is to make this truth content an object of experience.
For Cohen, these necessary, a priori laws define what an object of experience is for us.
Evans puts it: "[F]rom the fact that the self is not an object of experience it does not follow that it is non-experiential" (Evans 1970, 145).
Since this case is by definition one in which there is no mind-independent object being perceived, how can we even talk about something being an "object of experience" at all here?
In order to know something substantive about an object of experience, such as its essential properties, the faculty of reason, exercised through the mind's philosophical way of knowing, must be employed.
As an object in its most general sense is describable, although not definable, as something that is able to become an object of experience, values can also be described (but not defined) by their dispositional property of being able to become objects of value experiences.
The most immediate sphere is the "reality of experience" in which everything appears as an object of qualitative experience, or (in the 1916 version) as having a given object character (Gegenständlichkeit) that is fundamentally heterogeneous.
The aesthetic object is an object of sensory experience and enjoyed as such: it is heard, seen, or (in the limiting case) imagined in sensory form.
