To set an intention is like pouring the concrete for the foundation and starting the building process for the entire house.
But we'll see that Searle satisfies this, and even Gilbert does (if we interpret her talk of derived personal commitments as entailing an intention or intention-like state).
A goal is about achieving, an intention is more like aligning with all of our being towards the goal.
The main objection to this view, pressed forcefully by Hugh McCann (1991), is that it generates an unhappy proliferation of intention-like states, and that, by finding ambiguity in 'intention with which,' it fails to unify the guises of intention.
When a number is added to a term of first intention (like 'man'), the presence of this numerical term modifies the kind of supposition from simple to personal; but one can refer to a universal only with a term with simple supposition.
It's not clear that Gilbert herself would want to talk of this "concurrence condition" in terms of relating intention or intention-like attitudes in different participants.
On his view, partial intentions are intention-like states that figure as sub-strategies in the context of larger, more complex plans to accomplish a given end.
Such partial intentions are, Holton thinks, necessary for adequately rich psychological explanations: merely appealing to full intentions cannot succeed in capturing the wide range of phenomena that intention-like states appear to explain.
Those words hit me like a charge, an intention.
(To argue that the presence of sloppy, boiling-hot calzones belies their sandwich nature is a debate on elaboration, not intention, like saying that a leaky building proves that buildings are not a form of shelter).
Yes, it sounds like a noble intention, but this is the nature of meetings like this.
