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Exact(11)
So this is not an equilibrium strategy.
Thus, this is not an equilibrium strategy too.
Therefore, the strategy of joining with probability q e =0 is an equilibrium strategy.
Hence, in each step, every player plays an equilibrium strategy corresponding to that step.
Indeed, the transmitters implement an equilibrium strategy (referred to as the operating point) at every stage of the repeated game.
Of course, if a player fears that other players have not learned equilibrium, this may well remove her incentive to play an equilibrium strategy herself.
Similar(49)
As Gintis also stresses, this issue with solving extensive-form games games for SEP by Zermelo's algorithm generalizes: a player has no reason to play even a Nash equilibrium strategy unless she expects other players to also play Nash equilibrium strategies.
Note that a strong or coalition-proof Nash equilibrium does not necessarily coincide with a Nash equilibrium strategy profile, and the result of Figure 4 is an exception.
A heuristic equilibrium strategy based genetic algorithm (GA) is designed for solving the proposed EGAP.
Therefore, there exists a unique equilibrium strategy q e such that C T(q e )=R. 3) R≥C T(1).
Its operation does not even require truthfulness of each player to be a Nash equilibrium strategy, but it needs only aggregate correct revelation to be a Nash equilibrium, as was verified in Sato ([1983]).
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Justyna Jupowicz-Kozak
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