This special issue highlights what one author describes as an 'ambiguity of intention in male involvement interventions' in the case of interventions working to increase male involvement in mother, newborn and child health programmes (Comrie-Thompson this issue).
In his paper, 'The ambiguity of clinical intentions' [ 35], Dr. Timothy Quill explores his motivations in assisting the suicide of his patient.
Since this ambiguity of the term intention is not mentioned, the difference between palliative sedation and euthanasia is made to look bigger than it really is.
As regards the difference between palliative sedation at the end of life and so-called slow euthanasia, the rationale behind stressing the difference is insufficiently demonstrated, e.g. due to an overlooked ambiguity in the concept of intention.
As regards the difference between palliative sedation at the end of life and so-called slow euthanasia, the rationale behind stressing the difference is insufficiently demonstrated, at least partly due to an overlooked ambiguity in the concept of intention.
However, the EAPC framework (as well as other texts on this) fails to notice an ambiguity in the concept of intention, the awareness of which makes the initial impression of a vast moral difference between palliative sedation and euthanasia fade somewhat.
Still, semantic ambiguities between intention and planning may make the measurement domains of these proposed constructs similar even if the two constructs are conceptually different.
The main objection to this view, pressed forcefully by Hugh McCann (1991), is that it generates an unhappy proliferation of intention-like states, and that, by finding ambiguity in 'intention with which,' it fails to unify the guises of intention.
Indeed this ambiguity concerning the intention of interventions can be extended to the field of working with men and boys for gender equality more widely.
It was always a question of intention.
We thereby unify two guises of intention.
