The phrase "allocation of goods" is correct and usable in written English.
It can be used in contexts related to economics, logistics, or resource management when discussing how goods are distributed or assigned.
Example: "The allocation of goods during the crisis was crucial to ensure that essential supplies reached those in need."
Alternatives: "distribution of goods" or "assignment of goods".
What is common to these different approaches is that each, to some extent, shifts toward guiding the production and allocation of goods and services through market incentives rather than direct command and control or network forms of organization.
This requires a systemic coordination to prioritize the allocation of goods to desired locations.
The concept of distribution refers to the allocation of goods between different individuals or groups, while the concept of circulation refers to the movement of goods.
By conscious design, reformers in China only gradually focused their efforts on expanding the role of markets for the allocation of goods and services in the economy.
According to Spulber (2008), the economic equilibrium, including the structure of transactions, prices and allocation of goods, depends on the entrepreneurs' actions.
The first can be called the "coordination argument" (cf. Roemer 2012): the price system can transmit complex information about people's preferences in decentralized ways, which allows for the allocation of goods and services to where they are most wanted.
Let X = {x, y, z, …} be a set of social alternatives, for example possible worlds, policy platforms, election candidates, or allocations of goods.
Proportional equality in the treatment and distribution of goods to persons involves at least the following concepts or variables: Two or more persons (P1, P2) and two or more allocations of goods to persons (G) and X and Y as the quantity in which individuals have the relevant normative quality E. This can be represented as an equation with fractions or as a ratio.
Given that finding an optimal allocation of the goods in a combinatorial auction is in general intractable, researchers have been concerned with exposing tractable instances of combinatorial auctions.
For a large economy with private information about individual preferences, the two approaches are shown to be equivalent if and only if, in addition to incentive compatibility and participation constraints, the final allocation of private-good consumption and admission tickets to public goods satisfies a condition of renegotiation proofness.
