As we are using an observational study design and treatment allocation is non-randomised, bias in the form of confounding by indication will be present.
Thus, patient allocation was non-randomised, and the cohort of patients we analysed did not constitute random sampling.
Yet Nagel's allocations are non-exclusive; the same situation can be seen from either subjective or objective viewpoints, meaning that it is mysterious how we are to combine them into some overall view.
In this section, we present a result, which states that if the resource allocation strategy is non-manipulable, Pareto optimal satisfies property of non-participation, then the resource allocation strategy has to be discontinuous.
The property, that a particular resource allocation strategy is non-manipulable, is emulated by the SCF f satisfying the property strategy proofness.
This result shows the restriction of the available SCFs f, if we want them to satisfy the properties of strategy proofness and efficiency, i.e., the resource allocation strategy is non-manipulable and is Pareto optimal.
In particular, the adopted power allocation is quite "non-uniform" in the sense that the total power allocated to a given sensor is proportional to the number of orthogonal channels assigned to it.
Then, we estimate the impact of treatment, controlling for endogeneity through the use of a recursive bivariate model, which consists in assuming that allocation to treatment is non-random and endogenous to mortality.
This type of slot allocation is suitable for non-emergency based BMSs because the BMSs consume minimum energy with higher data reliability.
Under standard assumptions, that guarantee monotonicity of the allocation rule in one-dimensional mechanisms, it is shown that the optimal allocation will be non-monotonic in a (weakly) generic sense once the principal can use all screening variables.
Exploiting the concept of extremal transfers allows us to obtain an exact characterization of the set of implementable allocation rules (the set of transfers is non-empty) and the set of allocation rules satisfying Revenue Equivalence (the extremal transfers coincide).
