Sentence examples for adaptive preferences from inspiring English sources

Khader also wants to separate "inappropriately adaptive preferences," which are harmful to their bearers and adapted to bad social conditions, from merely adaptive preferences, which may not have these features (52 53).

People are prone to what philosophers call "adaptive preferences", meaning that they may fail to report their "true" happiness.

First of all, there are all kinds of "adaptive preferences", in which people reinterpret bad situations to make them more bearable: "sour grapes" – deciding that what you could not get is actually not as good as you had thought – is a classic example.

However, reactions to adaptive preferences vary in the feminist literature on autonomy.

Unlike feminists who locate the main problem with adaptive preferences as lying with their obstruction of the agent's autonomy, Khader rejects the view of adaptive preferences as autonomy deficits.

Another account that challenges the position that adaptive preferences automatically undercut autonomy is defended by Donald Bruckner (2007).

Or are we capable of "successful adaptive preference formation," otherwise known as change?

Bruckner argues that both adaptive preference change and adaptive preference formation are often rational.

Discussions of adaptive preference formation are often found in the literature both feminist and nonfeminist on rational choice theory (Elster 1983; Superson 2005; Cudd 2006).

Thus while one condition for the rationality of an adaptive preference for Elster is that it be autonomously acquired, for Bruckner, it is that the preference be autonomously retained (319).

According to Jon Elster's classic description of adaptive preference formation, a fox, after finding that he can no longer reach some grapes, decides that he does not want the grapes after all.