(For Scanlon, blame is a response to the meaning of someone's actions, rather than the permissibility of those actions. For more on this distinction, see the first three chapters of Scanlon 2008).
Similarly, if the soldier who throws himself on the grenade in order to shield his fellow soldiers from the force of an explosion acts permissibly, and if the permissibility of his action is explained by double effect, then he must not intend to sacrifice his own life in order to save the others, he must merely foresee that his life will end as a side effect of his action.
Since consequentialism makes the permissibility of an action entirely dependent on the value of that action's consequences, it follows that there is no type of action that can be prohibited on consequentialist grounds (except, of course, for that 'type' which is defined explicitly in terms of sub-optimal consequences).
If the permissibility of an action depended only on the consequences of the action, or only on the foreseen or foreseeable consequences of the action, then the distinction that grounds the principle of double effect would not have the moral significance claimed for it (see the related entry on consequentialism).
In each case, participants judged the moral permissibility of the action.
In a paper on abortion (The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, 1967), she used what became a much-cited example to pinpoint fine distinctions in moral permissibility where an action has both good and bad results – the dilemma facing the driver of a suddenly brakeless trolley-bus that would hit five people unless he steered it on to another track into only one person.
The doctrine (or principle) of double effect is often invoked to explain the permissibility of an action that causes a serious harm, such as the death of a human being, as a side effect of promoting some good end.
If these arguments are correct, then they cast doubt on the claim that Double Effect explains the permissibility of these actions.
It seems that our judgment about the legitimacy of this minimal state should turn at least primarily on how it now conducts itself and not on the permissibility of the actions that lead to its existence (Paul 1979).
FEC commissioners -- three Democrats and three Republicans -- deadlocked on the most controversial questions, leaving the permissibility of these actions up in the air.
