The phrase "acquaintance knowledge" is not commonly used in written English, but it is understandable.
It can be used to describe a type of knowledge that is based on familiarity or casual understanding rather than deep expertise.
Example: "While I have acquaintance knowledge of the subject, I would need to do further research to provide a comprehensive analysis."
Alternatives: "familiarity knowledge" or "superficial knowledge".
Acquaintance, Knowledge, and Logic brings together ten new essays on Russell's best-known work, The Problems of Philosophy.
Acquaintance, Knowledge, and Logic brings together ten new essays on Russell-s best-known work, The Problems of Philosophy.
According to Conee acquaintance constitutes a third category of knowledge that is neither reducible to factual knowledge nor to knowing-how and he argues that Mary acquires after release only acquaintance knowledge.
(Russell 1912, Chapter 5) The idea would be that, although in humans acquaintance knowledge gives rise to beliefs, God has just the cognitive relation to what he knows, without any consequent beliefs.
According to the Acquaintance Hypothesis proposed by Conee (1994), Mary's new knowledge after release is what he calls "acquaintance knowledge" which is neither propositional knowledge nor identical to a bundle of abilities.
(Alston 1986) Instead his knowledge, in particular of our actions, may be thought as Russellian acquaintance knowledge; that is, as consisting of a simple cognitive relation between the knower and what is known.
On the classical acquaintance theory, knowledge of both truths has the same source acquaintance with facts.
Knowledge by acquaintance is foundational knowledge because it depends on one's acquaintance with the object itself, or with properties of or facts about the object, and not on any further knowledge of truths.
Moreover, while Plato does prescribe a course of study in the Republic designed to promote one's dialectical abilities, and while it is agreed by both holists and intuitionists, those who allow for atomic or acquaintance-like knowledge of a Form, that the same Forms are the basic objects of knowledge, it does not follow that Plato thinks that there is only one way to secure knowledge of the Forms.
Later, he clarifies this point by adding that acquaintance involves, not knowledge of truths, but knowledge of things (1912a, 44).
Schlick expended considerable effort discussing the differences between intuitive acquaintance and conceptual knowledge, insisting that, even though intuitive images are real, acquaintance with them does not constitute knowledge.
