(Pitcher doesn't talk explicitly about accuracy conditions).
Some philosophers deny that experiences have accuracy conditions.
There are thus no accuracy conditions associated with such experiences.
The notion of accuracy conditions also leaves it open whether there could be accuracy conditions that were met whenever a subject had an experience with those conditions.
There are a number of positions that deny that experiences have accuracy conditions.
As stated so far, naïve realism is neutral on whether any experiences have accuracy conditions.
Claim (b) is a natural extension of (a), given the assumption that beliefs have accuracy conditions.
There is a third position that denies that experiences have accuracy conditions.
So according to Travis, the experience does not map onto any unique set of accuracy conditions.
He also offers further reasons for denying that experiences have accuracy conditions.
It is an open question how specific and how extensive such intuitions are, hence to what extent such intuitions can reveal which accuracy conditions experiences have, assuming that they have accuracy conditions at all.
