Sentence examples for account of representation from inspiring English sources

However, PHK 19 implies that the materialists are not in a position to render this account of representation philosophically satisfactory.

Nevertheless, this notion of semantic information is relevant here because it has been used by some theorists to ground an account of representation (Dretske 1981, Fodor 2008).

This account of representation seems to make room for error, because it implies that representations need only indicate their contents during recruitment or in the environment and given the channel conditions in which recruitment took place; error being possible after that time or in other environments or circumstances.

As we fit the social construction of human traits or kinds together with an account of representations, we see that one can be more or less thoroughgoingly constructionist.

Mansbridge's discussion of descriptive representation points to another trend within the literature on political representation — namely, the trend to derive normative accounts of representation from their function.

Burge stresses that veridicality is crucial, whereas error-based accounts of representation consider the lack of veridicality as the paradigmatic case of error.

Hutto (2013) argues that action-oriented accounts of representation cannot offer a viable notion of causally relevant content because "the contents of representations do not make a causal difference, only formal or vehicular properties do;" when one assumes computationalism, then the only causally relevant factors are forms of symbols in computers, irrelevant of their semantics.

Moreover, based on this way of understanding political representation, Young provides an alterative account of democratic representation.

He develops an account of mental representation and provides an analysis of consciousness in terms of mental representations, arguing that this results in a fully natural explanation for something that was otherwise mysterious.

The main strategy here is usually to generalize the argument outlined above: explanations in terms of representational mental states are costly and clumsy; there is no generally accepted account of mental representation; and there is reason to think that we will, eventually, be able to explain all kinds of agency without the ascription of representational mental states.

In short, Abelard gives something very like a linguistic account of mental representation or intentionality.