The phrase "abundant conception" is correct and usable in written English.
It can be used in contexts discussing ideas, creativity, or the generation of thoughts and concepts in a plentiful manner.
Example: "The artist's abundant conception of themes allowed her to create a diverse body of work that resonated with many audiences."
Alternatives: "rich imagination" or "prolific ideas".
The simplest abundant conception holds that every well-formed predicate expresses a property.
Here we are following Lewis's (1986) well-known terminology, which acknowledges a sparse and an abundant conception of properties.
It thus seems difficult to deny the existence of FU if the abundant conception of properties is adopted.
A form of dualitarianism can perhaps also be attributed to Lewis when he distinguishes between the sparse and the abundant conception of properties (see his 1986, p. 60).
Lewis argues that properties and relations, on this abundant conception, are well-suited to play the roles of semantic values in formal linguistics, and contents for mental states.
Under an abundant conception of properties, whether a predicate expresses a property depends only on its broadly syntactic facts about it.
Abundant conceptions will impose only broadly syntactic restrictions on the expression of propositions.
In discussing the question of whether there are properties, D. M. Armstrong (1989) distinguishes sparse from abundant conceptions of properties.
In standard first-order logic predicates come with a fixed degree and in line with this relations are usually taken to have a fixed degree themselves (on abundant conceptions of properties, there are relations of every finite number of argument places, but on sparse conceptions it is an empirical question whether there are relations of any particular degree).
These alternative conceptions are both abundant and persistent, and efforts to target them through instruction have yielded varied results (e.g., Bishop and Anderson 1990; Demastes et al. 1995, 1996; Dagher and BouJaoude 1997; Ferrari and Chi 1998; Nehm and Reilly 2007; Sinatra et al. 2008).
There is an abundant critical literature on Marshall's conception.
