The phrase "abstract mental" is correct and usable in written English.
It can be used to describe concepts or processes that are not tangible and exist primarily in thought or imagination.
Example: "The philosopher discussed the abstract mental constructs that shape our understanding of reality."
Alternatives: "conceptual thought" or "theoretical cognition."
Palaeopsychologists see this art as evidence that the artists could manipulate abstract mental symbols and so they surely could.
In fact, Turing believed that everything could be represented symbolically, even abstract mental states, and he was one of the first advocates of the artificial-intelligence position that computers can potentially "think".
The court said that Myriad's patent claims on the process of analyzing whether a patient's genes had mutations that raised the risk of cancer was not patentable because it involved only "patent-ineligible abstract mental steps".
Because it operated on general symbols rather than on numbers, it established "a link…between the operations of matter and the abstract mental processes of the most abstract branch of mathematical science".
Our results point to several functionally specific STS subregions, including a region in the right temporo-parietal junction that responded specifically to abstract mental state content; a region of posterior STS that responded specifically to dynamic human motion, and a region of middle STS that responded specifically to vocal sounds.
We need reasons to actively cultivate abstract mental activity for its own sake.
First, the issue is closely related to the problem of universals i.e., the problem of whether qualities or properties, such as redness, are abstract objects, mental concepts, or simply names.
Although the arguments for and against the various candidates are beyond the scope of this article, two points should be noted here: first, the issue is closely related to the problem of universals i.e., the problem of whether qualities or properties, such as redness, are abstract objects, mental concepts, or simply names.
According to "neo-Quineans", questions about the existence of abstract objects, mental events, objects with proper parts, temporal parts, and even other concrete possible worlds are united to the extent that they are questions about the ontological machinery required to account for the truth of our best-confirmed theories.
Concepts, in turn, are to be understood as abstract non-mental objects.
Whereas numerous reviewed abstracts discussed mental health and social inclusion or social integration, very few were concerned with direct measurement of the construct.
