The problem is that if I let go of a climbing rope, not as a direct result of willing to let it go, but as a result of being discomfited/paralyzed/shaken by the volition itself, then my letting go of the rope would not count as voluntary even though it was caused by a volition to let go of the rope.
It is "a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the deity, or the interposition of some invisible agent".
As we saw last week, in "Of Miracles", David Hume defined a miracle, rightly in my view, as "a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the deity, or the interposition of some invisible agent".
But of course Piero della Francesca was depicting a miracle, which the Scottish philosopher David Hume described as "a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent".
More specifically, it is "a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent" (EU, 11.12n/115n).
Hume also, in one of his definitions of "miracle," speaks of an event brought about "by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent".
If to perceive objects by some other mode than that of touch, or objects which lay out of the reach of that sense, were the thing proposed; could not a simple volition of the Creator have communicated the capacity?
He defined law as primarily "an assemblage of signs declarative of a volition conceived or adopted by the sovereign of a state" and so followed Hobbes and earlier theorists in thinking about law on the model of command.
This law is simply a backward, visceral objection to the thought of a woman behind the wheel, a physical embodiment of a volition which is too offensive to enact.
Such actions, then, cannot be composed of a volition and the motion that is willed, for the relevant volition is absent (more on volition below).
