The phrase "a true sentence" is correct and usable in written English.
It can be used when discussing the validity or accuracy of a statement or proposition.
Example: "In logic, a true sentence is one that accurately reflects reality or a fact."
Alternatives: "an accurate statement" or "a valid assertion".
Oscar Isaac, as a reawakened supervillain pursuing a new world order, doesn't bring much to proceedings, which is rarely a true sentence.
Sam wrote in to say "here's one from a Japanese T-shirt — probably more of a crazy word-string than a true sentence, but I'm loopy so it counts: ELECTRIC RESPONSE BEATNIK REBEL BLOOD TRANSLUCENT FUTURE" Beat that, readers.
If the formula results in a true sentence for any substitution of interpreted terms (of the appropriate logical type) for the variables, the formula and the sentence are said to be logically true (in the narrower sense of the expression).
But the value of his late experimental work was distinctly anti-Broadway: it was about the theatricalization of certain lonely truths, like the desire to speak and the work that goes into making a true sentence.
Transitive law, in mathematics and logic, any statement of the form "If aRb and bRc, then aRc," where "R" is a particular relation (e.g., "…is equal to…"), a, b, c are variables (terms that may be replaced with objects), and the result of replacing a, b, and c with objects is always a true sentence.
B is less a true sentence than a crazy word-string; D is a sharp simile but uses the word "akin," which I've never liked the sound of; E is an intentionally wretched metaphor; H is too tragic; I delights me, but for reasons I can't articulate (I think I just love the name "Floyd Flake J; J is lovely ("tears are the very wine of blessedness") but slightly purple.
But she might not speak a truer sentence than that last one.
According to Meinong, a subject term in any true sentence stands for an object (Meinong 1904).
Suppose we are considering a language that contains the standard logical operators, and so any sentence is a constituent of a necessarily true sentence.
(The view also predicts that all true sentences of mathematics express the same (necessary) proposition, that any two necessarily equivalent sentences express the same proposition, that the conjunction of any sentence S with a necessarily true sentence expresses the same proposition as S, and so on).
For that reason, everything one can speak about or think of is both a thing and an atomic state of affairs, while every true sentence expresses a molecular state of affairs, that is, the union (if the sentence is affirmative) or the separation (if the sentence is negative) of two (or more) atomic objects (on Wyclif's theory of proposition see Cesalli 2005).
