A number of exceptions to Lewis' theory of bonding have been catalogued here.
There are a couple of exceptions to this.
Sandewall (1986) presents a theory of multiple inheritance with exceptions (also called non- monotonic inheritance) based on a set of nonmonotonic inference rules, taking advantage at the same time of theories based on nonmonotonic logic as proposed by Etherington and Reiter and of path-based theories as proposed by Touretzky, Horty and Thomason.
Of course, these assertions are not widely accepted; they are extensions of the theory, not exceptions to it.
And, Carruthers maintains, there is little basis for thinking that any nonhuman animals have a theory of mind, with the possible exception of chimpanzees (see Lurz 2011 and Andrews 2012 for in depth discussion of theory of mind in nonhuman animals).
Christensen has compared the theory of disruptive innovation to a theory of nature: the theory of evolution.
This means that, with the exception of those who hold that we have only indirect duties to animals, all the traditions that Cochrane discusses can lay claim to offering a theory of justice for animals.
One notable exception to this is Hintikka and Halonen 1995, which develops a theory of why-questions in the context of Hintikka's interrogative model of inquiry.
But they, unlike Grosseteste, had not attempted to work out in any detail a theory of modality severing a link with considerations of time and change (the twelfth-century thinker, Peter Abelard, is an exception, but his theory of non-temporal modality, which takes as its central notion that of a thing's nature, is very different from Grosseteste's and had little influence).
Some later Epicureans developed a theory of inductive inference which bases the inference on empirical observation that certain properties concur without exception (Philodemus De Signis). to the conclusions of the relevant syllogisms.
