A story in the Cowboy-friendly newspaper, the Nugget, stated without attribution that "The Sheriff stepped out and said [to the Earps]: 'Hold up boys, don't go down there or there will be trouble; I have been down there to disarm them.'" In his testimony, Behan repeatedly insisted he told the Earps that he only intended to disarm the Cowboys, not that he had actually done so.
If mental state attribution bears a special connection with behavior, it is tempting to say that mentality just consists in behavioral tendencies.
As the medial prefrontal cortex activation detected in the present study was located at the dorsal and most posterior portion of the prefrontal cortex we propose that this region functions as an integration site bridging mental state attribution of similar/familiar to dissimilar/unknown others, thus human-likeness.
These data support a model developed over two decades ago by Gallup [Am. J. Primatol. 2 (1982) 237] that posits that self-awareness and mental state attribution are part of a shared neurocognitive suite of processing and that neural architecture implicated in processing knowledge about the self is called upon when inferring knowledge in others.
Mental state attribution, as measured by a computerized version of the Mind in the Eyes Revised Test, was associated with activation in the right superior and middle frontal gyri, medial superior frontal gyrus, and left middle frontal gyrus and superior temporal gyrus/temporal pole.
Loosely speaking, behaviorism is an attitude -- a way of conceiving of empirical constraints on psychological state attribution.
To summarize the present study provides first evidence that the degree of human-likeness of a counterpart modulates its perception, influences the communication and behaviour, biases "mental" state attribution and, finally, affects cortical activity during such interactions.
Those "probably"s expose part of the appeal of cyberwar for nation states: attribution is hard, and rock-solid attribution to not just a nation but a chain of command is almost impossible.
It has also been hypothesized that self-awareness and mental state attribution (inferences about the mental experience of others) are part of a similar neurocognitive process [Am. J. Primatol. 2 (1982) 237].
Self-face recognition and mental state attribution were colocalized to the middle and superior frontal gyri in the right hemisphere.
Accordingly we proceed to discuss the neural underpinnings of imitation and other mechanisms important for cultural learning: learning biases, mental state attribution, and reinforcement learning.
