A third enquiry, led by Sir Muir Russell, is due to report next month.
Thus, these are simple and limited comparisons but they serve as a first enquiry into the forces that might shape genome evolution.
Hume's second Enquiry is a sustained and systematic attack on the "selfish" or "self-love" theories of Hobbes and Mandeville.
In line with Collingwood's conception of philosophical analysis as a second order enquiry into first order forms of knowledge, it is the task of the philosophy of history to make explicit the explanatory principles that are implicit in the practice of historians.
In the second Enquiry, Hume continues to oppose moral rationalism, but his arguments against them appear in an appendix.
Thomas Reid spoke of "the immortal Hugo Grotius," Hutcheson drew on him extensively, and Hume approvingly cited an argument of his about the origins of property in the third appendix of his second Enquiry.
In both the Treatise and the second Enquiry, Hume charged rational intuitionists with having no account of why moral judgments, which are the output of reason, should have such an intimate connection with motivation.
In neither the Treatise nor the second Enquiry does Hume spend any significant time on how we might learn to acquire new sentiments or alter the ones we have.
What is our concern, however, is to make clear that what Hume aims at, in both the Treatise and the second Enquiry, is to defend the "autonomy" of morality in relation to religion.
The idea of Hume's argument here and elsewhere in his writings (see for instance Dialogue XII of his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and appendix IV of the second Enquiry) is that theism, or at least theism of the popular sort that conjoined with "superstitious terrors," degrades individual morality, thereby devaluing human existence.
