Using a computer syntax called regex, for regular expressions, I had written a filter that recognized any of an infinite number of such patterns.
regexner.validpospattern: If given (non-empty and non-null) this is a regex that must be matched (with find againstat least one token in a match for the NE to be labeled.
We've set up a regex editor you can use to design, test, and submit your solutions to some of the problems.
For example: the regex (?<!ScrollPaneLayout.|BasicComboBoxEditor). (∖ bUIResource ∖b) matches UIResource but does not match neitherScrollPaneLayout.UIResource nor BasicComboBoxEditor.UIResource 6) (∖b [A-Z_]+[a-z_0-9]+)2, ∖b [A-Z_([A-Z_])2,[a-z_0-9]+ ∖b)| ([̱A-Z_]+[a-z_0-9]+[A-Z_]+ ∖b) Regex for matching multi-word API element short name (camel case).
Table 11 Regular expressions used in the process of linking Stack Overflow threads with API elements 1) ((?s) Regex for matching comments inside "/* */" or preceded by "//" 2) ((?s) Regex for matching natural language text inside "" 3) (∖ bElementShortName ∖b) Regex for API element short name boundary matching.
For example: the regex(∖ bDefaultTableCellRenderer ∖b)(?!.UIResource)matches DefaultTableCellRenderer but does not matchDefaultTableCellRenderer.UIResource 5) (?∖ bElementShortName ∖b) Regex for API element short name boundary matching with negative look-behind.
For example: the regex (∖ bJCheckBox ∖b) matches JCheckBox but does not match JCheckBoxMenuItem 4) (∖ bElementShortName ∖b)(?!.PartialShortNames) Regex for API element short name boundary matching with negative look-ahead.
We create a template for each such chunk, which contains records, with regexes for each record that we wish to match and from which we will extract information.
ChemicalTagger then falls back on a customised regex tagger and then a parts-of-speech tagger for the tokens which have not been identified.
StanfordCoreNLP includes TokensRegex, a framework for defining regular expressions over text and tokens, and mapping matched text to semantic objects.
That's because the vulnerable apps use a wildcard regex, allowing all office.com — including his newly controlled subdomain — to be trusted.
