The phrase "a reductionist of" is not correct and does not convey a clear meaning in written English.
It may be intended to describe someone who practices reductionism, but the construction is awkward and unclear.
Example: "As a scientist, he is often seen as a reductionist, focusing on the simplest explanations for complex phenomena."
Alternatives: "a proponent of reductionism" or "an advocate for reductionist approaches".
(Even timid fictionalism is compatible with a reductionist account of modality, of course, since the timid fictionalist may seek to explain modality in some other terms. It is just that it is not hospitable to reductionist accounts of modality in terms of possible worlds).
But most of the cruelties in the world, including those against Muslims, are sustained in the name of a reductionist view of humanity.
In the latter case, one accepts a challenge to provide a reductionist story of a seemingly unique sort of phenomenon, and meets it by developing better experimental and analytical tools.
In an interlude (1934 1938), Lorente embarked in studies of neuron physiology that inclined him to a reductionist interpretation of the axon as the main functionally relevant entity of neurons.
In many cases, it will be quite apparent how this holistic view of organismal biology runs counter to many other approaches, such as a reductionist focus of inferring ecological functions from a static description of discrete morphological traits.
Similarly, Bosanquet's opposition to seeing religion or religious belief as a faith in something supernatural does not mean that he denied the existence of the spiritual or held a reductionist view of reality.
In bipedal locomotion, the 'compass gait', a reductionist model of inverted pendulum walking, predicts the boundaries of speed and step length within which walking is feasible.
Though setting himself squarely against the perils of loose speculation, he also rejected a reductionist account of behaviourism that he associated with Watson and Pavlov, which to him made simplistic links between human and animal investigations, ignoring the selective and constructive character of perception and memory, and the cultural context in which these operated.
The doctrine that all scientific language must acquire meaning via "operational definitions" in terms of measurement procedures and the like constitutes a reductionist form of scientific antirealism.
