The phrase "a reasonable agent" is correct and usable in written English.
It can be used in contexts discussing decision-making, behavior, or expectations regarding an agent's actions or judgments.
Example: "In this scenario, a reasonable agent would consider all available evidence before making a decision."
Alternatives: "a rational agent" or "a prudent agent".
This suggests that a dual inhibitor of 5α-reductase isoenzymes, such as dutasteride, may be a reasonable agent to evaluate for prevention of prostate cancer (Gomella 2005).
For those patients who need continuous sedation (that is, those on mechanical ventilation), nocturnal propofol may be a reasonable agent to use - based on some animal studies suggesting that resolution of sleepiness known to occur under natural sleep may also occur under sedation with propofol [ 51, 52].
Although the types of reasons differed moral discourse rested primarily on need interpretations, empirical-theoretical discourse on empirical inductions in both cases, the relevant reasons should, in principle, be acceptable to any reasonable agent.
Indeed, a Platonist/realist about moral value could claim that the objective values which (according to the theory) apply to all agents independent of choice are in fact "self-imposed" in this idealized sense: they would be imposed were the person to reflect on the matter, acting as a perfectly reasonable agent.
"FlyGuy also stated that he believed the asking price was a reasonable amount," Agent Schmatz wrote, "since, in FlyGuy's opinion, the defendants, tobacco companies, might very well lose a jury verdict".
If a trial was designed to investigate this line of query, a reasonable immunosuppressive agent of choice might be methotrexate.
The property of rightness is constituted by what a group of reasonable agents, under certain specified conditions, would find non-rejectable (Scanlon 1998, 380 n. 48).
Thus, a reasonable bio-agent is needed to reduce bovine Mycobacterial infection risk and environment contamination.
More specifically, in a religiously pluralistic context such as one finds in contemporary liberal democracies, are religious reasons sufficient to justify a coercive law for which reasonable agents cannot find an adequate secular rationale?
This distinction is often formulated in terms of a distinction between (merely) rational agents, and "reasonable" agents.
In Kantian categories, this second line of argument singles out not the evil of heteronomous considerations, but the goodness of considerations that autonomous and reasonable agents could accept as an appropriate basis for settling fundamental political questions.
