The phrase "a practical reasoning" is not correct in standard English; it should be "practical reasoning" without the article "a." You can use "practical reasoning" when discussing the process of thinking through a problem or situation in a practical, logical manner.
Example: "In making decisions about the project, we need to rely on practical reasoning to evaluate the best course of action."
Alternatives: "practical thought" or "pragmatic reasoning."
A parallel is thereby established with direct discrimination, in which there is something morally wrong with a practical-reasoning process that treats sex, race, or religion as grounds for treating persons as having a degraded or diminished moral status.
(The presumption that desires or more generally motivations explain action is plausibly a legacy of a theory of practical reasoning on which desires are reasons for actions — and therefore, it is concluded, their causes — but that theory is off-limits to Velleman's project, and should not be appealed to by it, however indirectly).
Brickhouse et al. (2002, p. 582) stated that "justifying belief in a scientific theory is always a matter of practical reasoning in which a variety of criteria are weighed in making a decision on acceptance or rejection".
Very schematically, these arguments for a theory of practical reasoning try to show that reasons brought to bear on choice must have some particular logical form, if action is not to lapse into something less than that.
At an opposite extreme, Kant's categorical imperative has been taken to generate an approach to practical reasoning (via a "typic of practical judgment") that is distinctive from other practical reasoning both in the range of considerations it addresses and its structure (Nell 1975).
This article takes up moral reasoning as a species of practical reasoning — that is, as a type of reasoning directed towards deciding what to do and, when successful, issuing in an intention (see entry on practical reason).
First-order reasons compete on the basis of strength; but conflicts between first- and second-order reasons "are resolved not by the strength of the competing reasons but by a general principle of practical reasoning which determines that exclusionary reasons always prevail" (40).
In this respect, Bradley offers a theory of practical reasoning.
We are concerned here with moral reasoning as a species of practical reasoning — reasoning directed to deciding what to do and, if successful, issuing in an intention.
