Not necessarily, for Retentional theorists can insist that we need to distinguish between succession as a purely phenomenal feature – i.e., a property of conscious mental states or representations – and succession as a property of physical events in the wider world.
If the Extensional conception of Jamesian 'duration-blocks' expounded earlier were along the right lines, then experienced succession would be an intrinsic phenomenal feature of temporally extended experiences, and as such would not require the successive coming-into-being of experiential phases.
Unofficially queer, it kicks off the summer season on the Cape with a celebration of phenomenal feature programming and parties across five days in June.
Since the self as pre-reflectively experienced is the basis of all phenomenal features of our experience, it must be considered as basic and fundamental for any subsequent cognitive activity.
Since the successive constituents which compose a duration-block are live experiences, the Extensional specious present also conforms fully to the Immediacy Thesis (see §3): change can be experienced with the same force, vivacity (or immediacy) as colour, sound or any other phenomenal feature.
A few years ago, I watched a phenomenal video featuring the author Ami Chen Mills-Naim teaching teenagers about the nature of thought and consciousness.
They are codetermined by a quest for meaningful interrelations between the observed phenomenal features, as when one looks for an "ideal type" [ 59].
On their view, to have phenomenal features is to have a certain sort of nonconceptual content.
As a result, the relation between the physical and phenomenal features "will appear contingent even if it is necessary, because of the independence of the disparate types of imagination" (Nagel 1974, footnote 11).
Such a phenomenal self is thus open to systematic investigation of the phenomenal features of our experience which would complement the metaphysical, empirical, and logical approaches to the self.
