The phrase "a logical knowledge" is not commonly used in written English and may sound awkward.
It could be used in contexts discussing the nature of knowledge that is based on reasoning or rational thought.
Example: "In philosophy, we often explore the concept of a logical knowledge that underpins our understanding of reality."
Alternatives: "rational understanding" or "reasoned knowledge".
The resulting probabilistic generalizations of default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases allow for handling in a uniform framework strict logical knowledge, default logical knowledge, as well as purely probabilistic knowledge.
But, insofar as the irrationality in violating the axioms stems from the fact that it is supposed to be a form of inconsistency, as both Hitchcock and Christensen maintain, then the fact that a bookie might need (logical) knowledge that the agent lacks in order to set up the book, is irrelevant to whether the book has force.
For on the one hand, a traditional view in epistemology is that logical knowledge – e.g. knowledge that certain statements are logical validities – is a paradigm case of a priori knowledge.
Come up with logical knowledge that will spark a conversation he had no clue of!
A third issue concerns Boghossian (2001 and 2003)'s explanation of our logical knowledge via implicit definitions, criticised as resting on a non-transmissive argument schema (see for instance Ebert 2005 and Jenkins 2008).
Model-based reasoning has been proposed as an alternative form of representing and accessing logical knowledge bases.
Since logical knowledge representation is commonly based on nonclassical formalisms like default logic, autoepistemic logic, or circumscription, it is necessary to perform abductive reasoning from theories (i.e., knowledge bases) of nonclassical logics.
This entry will take logical knowledge as given, but take no view on its explanation.
In this paper, we consider computational issues when combining logical knowledge bases, which are represented by their characteristic models; in particular, we study taking their logical intersection.
The transition model then determines the next logical knowledge state, or what the learner is ready to learn next.
