Sentence examples for a justifying reason from inspiring English sources

An exciting reason is a motive which actually prompts a person to act; a justifying reason is one which grounds moral approval of the act.

The latter questions, you should reply, would be as absurd as my request for stating a justifying reason for your perceptual experience.[46] Experiential foundationalism, then, is not easily dislodged.

Williams seeks to put flesh on WB by characterizing what he calls sound deliberative routes, the thought then being that if R is a justifying reason for A, there is some sound deliberative route from A's actual motivational state to a state where he is motivated to act in a way that R would explain.

His argument thus ultimately rests on the credibility of his sense that the internalist understanding of a justifying reason he spells out in this way is clear and straightforward while the rival understanding of justifying reasons as external reasons is mysterious and opaque.

The risk of recurrence should not be considered as a justifying reason to avoid transplantation as a treatment method.

The risk of recurrence should not be considered as a justifying reason to avoid the transplantation option.

The latter is a distinction between two kinds of justifying reason, the justifying reasons that apply to my circumstances as I, incompletely and perhaps incorrectly, understand them (subjective reasons) and the justifying reasons that apply to my circumstances as they actually are (objective reasons).

The history of § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act indicates that selling below cost, unless mitigated by some acceptable business exigency, was intended to be prohibited by the words 'unreasonably low prices.' That sales below cost without a justifying business reason may come within the proscriptions of the Sherman Act has long been established.

While we should call upon states to respect justificatory secularism, we cannot impose a similar restraint on the justifying reasons advanced by citizens or their elected representatives.

The latter thesis is a form of judgment internalism, which holds that a necessary connection exists between sincere moral judgment and either justifying reasons or motives: necessarily, if an individual sincerely judges that she ought to φ, then she has a reason or motive to φ. Judgment internalism must be distinguished from the thesis of existence internalism, which we considered earlier.

The second is no less unhelpful partly because reasons to regard an action as justified are also reasons for performing it, partly because it exhibits Frankena's tendency to identify justifying reasons with specifically moral reasons whereas justifying reasons, as such, need have nothing to do with moral concern.