Sentence examples for a justification for believing from inspiring English sources

It is worth emphasising that the thesis that Moore's proof is useless because non-transmissive in the sense explained is compatible with the claim that by learning E8 in Moore s does acquire a justification for believing P8.

A theory of perceptual justification treats not-r (i.e., the logical negation of r) conservatively with respect to p if it says that s acquires a justification for believing p on the basis of her apparent perception that p only if she has independent justification for believing not-r.

Whereas a theory of perceptual justification treats not-r liberally with respect to p if it says that in order to acquire a justification for believing p on the basis of her apparent perception that p, s does not need any independent justification for not-r.

A foundationalist of that kind views a basic belief that p as a belief whose justification does not depend on having any justification for believing another proposition q.

Indeed.It is not yet clear how many of the conspirators were killed, nor whether they had any justification for believing that units of the Gambian army would turn their coats.

It's more plausible to think that we have a priori justification for believing that if someone is a bachelor, he is unmarried (and if some animal is a vixen, it is female) and a posteriori (empirical) justification for thinking there are bachelors and vixens.

Suppose s has a fallible justification for believing P7 based on s's experience as if the animal in the garbage is a fox.

If we have justified concepts, we can examine them to see what they involve and then have a priori justification for believing that certain propositions that involve them are true of the world.

The epistemic conservative takes the mere fact that you find yourself believing some proposition P to be a prima facie justification for believing the proposition in question.

Fear is an intentional state, but from the fact that I fear ghosts, it hardly seems to follow that I have a prima facie justification for believing that are ghosts.

(3) says that if s had not been antecedently justified in believing q, upon learning e, s would have acquired via transmission a first-time justification for believing q. (3) entails that if q were not antecedently justified for s, e would still justify p for s.