Higher-order theories of consciousness try to explain the distinctive properties of consciousness in terms of some relation obtaining between the conscious state in question and a higher-order representation of some sort (either a higher-order perception of that state, or a higher-order thought or belief about it).
Is it a higher-order perception of one's mind's operation, or is it a higher-order thought about one's mental activity?
We propose that robot self-consciousness is based on higher order perception of the robot, in the sense that first-order robot perception is the immediate perception of the outer world, while higher order perception is the perception of the inner world of the robot.
Brentano, who argued that every mental phenomenon is object of inner perception, has sometimes been regarded as an early proponent of a higher-order perception theory of consciousness (cf., for example, Güzeldere 1997, 789).
That is to say, these are states that are the objects of some sort of higher-order representation whether a higher-order perception or experience, or a higher-order belief or thought.
For example, impairment is widely reported on tasks of higher order perception (e.g. non-canonical object recognition, complex spatial analysis) which rely on cognitive processes associated with parietal and occipito-temporal mechanisms downstream in the visual system.
Thus the proprioception which constitutes consciousness, as distinguished from mere awareness, is a higher order awareness, a perception of one part of (or configuration in) our brain by the brain itself.
All minds would have higher-order perceptions of themselves and their mental states, undermining Leibniz's ability to distinguish among conscious/non-conscious substances or conscious/non-conscious perceptions within a single substance.
These reports are summarized by a higher order factor called effortful control, which reflects perceptions about the ability of a given person to regulate their behavior in accord with cultural norms.
Many scholars believe that Leibniz is arguing for higher-order theory of consciousness, where consciousness is constituted by a first-order perception and a distinct higher-order perception.
For Rowlands (2001) is explicit that the regress objection doesn't operate against higher-order perception accounts of consciousness.
