First, according to fictionalism about a given discourse, the discourse is in important respects analogous to paradigmatic cases of fiction.
The central of this phase is an algorithm for computing verbal relationships in the process of generating the Vietnamese paragraph from the logical expression of discourse representation structure (DRS), which is the first-order logic expressions without explicit quantifiers, and represents the meaning as well as reflects the potential contexts of a given discourse or a sequence of sentences.
This leaves a range of potential objects: utterances, utterances relative to a context, sentences, sentences relative to a context, sentences given discourse relations, inscriptions and a whole host of possibilities that need to be sorted out.
In the logical expression, in which two representation forms are equivalent, the DRS form represents the meaning as well as reflects the context change potential of the given discourse.
Since the mid 80s, research has tended to pay more attention to context, giving discourse analysis a more central role.
In other words, while Stack Exchange tries to help users find the best answer to a given question, Discourse tries to support a broader discussion without falling victim to the trolling and spam that afflict many other forums and comment threads.
Habermas has also attempted to give discourse ethics some empirical foothold by looking to moral psychology and social anthropology (1990a, 116 94).
The reductionist about a given area of discourse ("A-discourse") maintains that its characteristic statements ("A-statements") are reducible to analyzable or translatable without loss of content into statements of some other type ("B-statements"), which are usually thought to be philosophically less problematic.
Borderline cases between logical and nonlogical constants are the following (among others): (1) Higher order quantification, which means quantification not over the individuals belonging to a given universe of discourse, as in first-order logic, but also over sets of individuals and sets of n-tuples of individuals.
Thus, given the choice, Lynch following up on a suggestion from Pettit (1996: 886)—urged functionalists to identify truth, not with the properties realizing the F-role in a given region of discourse, but with the F-role itself.
The problem of ontological commitment is a problem in meta-ontology rather than ontology proper.[1] The meta-ontologist asks (among other things): What entities or kinds of entity exist according to a given theory or discourse, and thus are among its ontological commitments?
