The phrase "a genuine perception" is correct and usable in written English.
It can be used when discussing someone's authentic understanding or interpretation of a situation or experience.
Example: "Her ability to empathize with others stems from a genuine perception of their feelings and struggles."
Alternatives: "an authentic understanding" or "a true insight".
Mahesh Hi Mahesh, Racism has and remains a genuine perception as well as the common experience of the majority of African, Caribbean and Asian people.
Now suppose instead that we say that if a conscious mental event is introspectively indiscriminible from a genuine perception it has the same phenomenal properties as a genuine perception.
But from the fact that a conscious mental event is introspectively indiscriminible from a genuine perception, does it follow that must have the same phenomenal properties as a genuine perception?
On one understanding such talk is taken to be introducing the notion of a conscious mental event that is not a genuine perception but which is introspectively indiscriminible from a genuine perception of the world.
Some object to Martin's suggestion that being subjectively indiscriminible from a genuine perception is a sufficient condition for being a perceptual experience.
They are rather supposed to be merely possible events: experiences which are indistinguishable for the subject from a genuine perception of an object.
Martin's response to the argument is to say that the naïve realist should affirm that in the case of a causally matching hallucination, there is no more to the phenomenal character of such an experience than that of being introspectively indiscriminible from a certain genuine perception.
Thus feeling pain is a not a form of genuine perception.
What justifies this interpretation is a reasonable condition on genuine perception: an experience kind is genuinely perceptual only if it generally gives rise to proprietary concept applications whose semantic focus is the proper object of this kind of experience.
The disjunctivist may insist that in a case of genuine perception, even if the objects of perception are distal causes of the subject's experience, they are also figure non-causally as essential constituents of it.
One's concern should simply be to oppose a conjunctive account of genuine perception.
