If a colleague gets a promotion you wanted, envy may be fitting in this sense, and consequently, given a fitting attitudes account of evaluative properties, the colleague will be enviable.
Intuitionists may respond to this objection by drawing on a recent version of Ewing's fitting attitude analysis of goodness.
Such an analysis, which has come to be called "the fitting attitude analysis" of value, is supported by the mundane observation that, instead of saying that something is good, we often say that it is valuable, which itself just means that it is fitting to value the thing in question.
Yet for all that, the most fitting attitude with which to regard Sen. Reid is pity.
According to the most straightforward and ambitious form of the fitting attitude theory of value, to be valuable is to be the fitting object of some evaluative attitude.
I will term these broadest and most ambitious forms of the view generic fitting attitude theories of value.
It will prove most perspicuous to hold two related but distinct claims as constitutive of fitting attitude accounts.
The revival of interest in fitting attitude theory is largely due to several influential defenses of each of its constituent claims.
Issues of semantics aside, it will be helpful to differentiate the buck-passing account from the fitting attitude theory of value.
Fitting attitude (FA) theories propose to analyze value, or some limited range of values, in terms of evaluative attitudes endorsed as fitting or, alternatively, as appropriate, correct, merited, proper, rational, or warranted.
