The phrase "a correct account of" is correct and usable in written English.
It can be used when discussing the accuracy or truthfulness of a description or narrative regarding a particular subject or event.
Example: "The historian provided a correct account of the events leading up to the revolution, ensuring that all perspectives were represented."
Alternatives: "an accurate representation of" or "a truthful depiction of".
I was with Pace; he has given a correct account of what passed; all that he has stated is perfectly correct and true.
For care and attention to developing a correct account of the nature of being, he tells us, will allow the philosopher to avoid many errors.
Since "ought" implies "can", we have reason to doubt that the contractarian approach gives us a correct account of the morality we ought to follow.
Since a correct account of intuition can explain why we are justified in accepting the laws of logic (and, I'd add, of induction and inference to the best explanation), these cases do not represent problems for rational intuitionism.
Nor does Ryle deny that usually when we witness something, or feel something, or act in such-and-such a way we are able, when asked, to give a correct account of it.
Once the Open Question is sidelined as being, at least, not decisive, room is left for thinking a correct account of the moral facts might identify them as natural facts.
Since the mid-20th century, however, advances in modal logic in particular the development of possible-world semantics—have given rise to a further, distinctively ontological dispute concerning whether that semantics gives a literally correct account of the "truth-conditions" of modal propositions.
In the revision theory it is argued that this gives a more correct account of truth and self-reference than Kripke's theory in which the liar sentence is simply assigned the value undefined.
Whatever is the correct account of a priori justification could then be used to fill out the details of the account of a priori knowledge.
If we accept that this is the correct account of a posteriori necessities, and also deny the analytically reductionist theories that would be necessary for a priori connections between mind and body, as conceived, for example, by the behaviourist or the functionalist, does it follow that we can tell a priori that consciousness is not more-than-causally dependent on the body?
Intention must figure in the correct account of acting for a reason, and thus intentionally.
