The phrase "a conventional nature" is correct and usable in written English.
It can be used to describe something that is typical, standard, or widely accepted in a particular context.
Example: "The artwork displayed a conventional nature, adhering to traditional styles and techniques that have been used for centuries."
Alternatives: "a traditional character" or "a standard quality".
First, each conventionally real phenomenon satisfies only the definition of conventional truth because each phenomenon has only a conventional nature (in contrast to the two nature theory of Gelug), and that ultimate truth has a transcendent ontological status.
From the point of view of the effectiveness of the system of human rights protection, the secondary question remains of whether this value possesses an ontological nature – it is inscribed in the human being but it also has a conventional nature – yet of far greater importance is the problem of its normative character.
British film-making also offered first-timers of a more conventional nature: Richard E Grant's Wah-Wah, Gaby Dellal's On a Clear Day and Steven Woolley's Stoned.
When the photographer and fashion plate Manuela Pavesi came across a villa 20 minutes outside of her primary residence in Mantua, Italy, she was beguiled by its history — although it was of a somewhat less conventional nature.
It argues that the conventional nature of an entity, as verified by a conventionally reliable cognitive process, determines the defining criterion of conventional truth; the ultimate nature of the same entity, as verified by an ultimately reliable cognitive practice, determines the defining criterion of ultimate truth.
And the idea that embracing wildness will soothe human trauma is "a beguiling but dangerous lie," she writes in a book that is a dark, pacy and witty challenge to conventional nature writing.
Due to the conventional nature of the relaying, a UE is connected either directly to an eNB or an RN, but not to both.
Unlike the eliminative materialist who regards conventional, folk-psychological discourse about persons as unsupported by, say, neuroscientific data (and thus is willing to dispense with a theory of persons altogether), the Buddhist reductionist merely points to the conventional nature of persons as ordinarily conceived.
One consequence of the conventional nature of language, according to which the relation between a sign and a significate is imposed on the sign by a voluntary act on the part of the impositor, is that the change in what is signified by the sign does not require a change in the sign (NLPery I.1; Lewry 1981).
For they all have an ultimate nature corresponding to ultimate truth, just as they have conventional nature corresponding to conventional truth.
This conventional nature of belief in value incommensurability in Raz's account raises a question for some authors about its robustness as an account of value incommensurability.
