The phrase "a commitment to the existence" is correct and usable in written English.
It can be used when discussing a pledge or dedication to maintaining or supporting something's presence or reality.
Example: "The organization has made a strong commitment to the existence of cultural heritage sites in the region."
Alternatives: "a dedication to the presence" or "a pledge to uphold existence".
Likewise, if bound first-order variables are assumed to range over sets (as they do in set theory), a commitment to the existence of these sets is incurred.
So how can a commitment to the existence of fusions be ontologically innocent?
Plato agrees: he regards a commitment to the existence of propositions as evidence of Platonism, acceptance of the claim that abstract objects (and plenty of them) genuinely exist.
It may be that descriptions of experience like this involve a commitment to the existence of things outside the experience; but surely it is possible to describe experience without this commitment?
One recent suggestion is that although a commitment to the existence of fusions is not ontologically innocent, it almost is: to commit oneself to fusions is to commit oneself to further entities, but because they are not fundamental entities they are not ones that matter for the purpose of theory choice (Cameron 2014, Schaffer 2008, Williams 2010, and see also Hawley 2014).
We note, however, that according to Belnap (2001, Ch. 6) the notion of "actual future" is problematic and he would simply say that tensed formulae are in general neither true nor false at a moment; they are true or false at pairs (moment, history), but without any commitment to the existence of an "actual future".
"When you join, you basically make a commitment to the farm to ensure its existence," said Jonathan Hilton, 49, an arts administrator from Manhattan, who donated $5,000 with his partner.
This invites the objection, raised both by Tennant (1987: 236) and by Boolos (1987: 184) that in certain conspicuous cases there is no a priori justification for commitment to the existence of denotations for these terms, in the case of particularly problematic concepts Φ (such as self-identity).
Hume's attack on the supposition that we have an idea of the mind as distinct from its impressions thus constitutes a rejection of Berkeley's commitment to the existence of mental substances, but not of ontological idealism altogether.
Since they carry no commitment to the existence of A, the judgement 'The Loch Ness monster lives in Scotland' can be true on such an interpretation.
Maintaining that individual natures are primarily diverse amounts not to having no theory of individuation, but to accepting a form of haecceitism that, like Adams's, does not involve ontological commitment to the existence of real haecceities as distinct real constituents of things.
