Certain utterances may be related to courtship and mating or to territory; others seem to be simply a part of the bird's general daily activity.
"Casting our minds back to the role played by certain utterances in naven, we might even say that we are thus moving on from the study of actions in loco verbi to the study of verba in loco actus.
In the same spirit, Michael Houseman and Carlo Severi revisited the famous ritual case "naven" and put forward the following statement: "Casting our minds back to the role played by certain utterances in naven, we might even say that we are thus moving on from the study of actions in loco verbi to the study of verba in loco actus.
Austin takes promising to be an illocutionary act, that is, he takes it that promising is merely a matter of a certain form of utterance, under certain conditions.
Michael Devitt (1981) says that the referent of an utterance of 'that' is the item that stands in a certain causal relation to the utterance.
Hare in particular remarks that there could be a society with a convention that utterance of a certain expression constituted performance of a certain illocutionary act, even those utterances that occur on stage or as used by jokers or storytellers.
I do not mean by my utterance that I am uttering a certain sentence.
Attitudinal accounts see consent as a mental state of affirmation or willingness, while performative accounts see it as a certain kind of action or utterance (for instance, saying "yes" or nodding).
Some theorists have challenged the coherence of non-cognitivism by arguing that if the appropriateness of an assertive utterance depends on a certain descriptive condition being fulfilled, then that descriptive condition constitutes (part of the) truth condition for that utterance.
On second glance, however, his utterances depict a certain honest Zen-like wisdom: "If you don't know where you're going, you'll wind up somewhere else,""It was hard to have a conversation with anyone there were so many people talking".
The locutionary act is the act of "'saying something' in the full normal sense" (1962: 94), which is the utterance of certain words with certain meanings in a certain grammatical construction, such as uttering 'I like ice' as a sentence of English.
