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If one accepts a representational view of belief, it's plausible to suppose that the relevant representations are structured in some way that the belief that P & Q, for instance, shares something structurally in common with the belief that P. To say this is not merely to say that the belief that P & Q has the following property: It cannot be true unless the belief that P is true.
Roots and weights of the relevant representations are described in detail.
One view is that the relevant representations are language-like, that is, they have the kind of syntactic structure exhibited by sentences in a language.
All the relevant representations now seem to be imagery of some sort, and we have already argued that we should not differentiate imagery codes on the basis of sensory modality.
As Block (1981a, 1983a) points out, an advantage of defining mental imagery in this way (i.e., as an unspecified form of representation, as {3} rather than {2}) is that it does not beg the controversial question of whether the relevant representations are, in any interesting sense, picture-like.
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On Millikan's theory, when the relevant representation is used to communicate between creatures, the producer and the consumer of the representation are different creatures.
From this weaker requirement on preferences that they be extendible to a preference ordering that satisfies the relevant axioms one can prove the existence halves of the relevant representation theorems.
The relevant representation is recruited by conditioning to indicate the distal feature rather than the disjunction of more proximal features, because there is no finite time-invariant disjunction of more proximal stimuli that it has the function of indicating.
If the frog is representing the stimulus as a fly, for instance, it misrepresents something that is small, dark and moving that is not a fly, using the relevant representation.
In the case of the frog's detection device, its responding to small, dark, moving things and its helping the frog to catch and swallow something nutritious both played a causal role in selection of the relevant representation producing or consuming systems.
If, rather, sense (3) is intended, the assumption would be fine, because tautologous (a quality cannot occur without a quality occurring); but the objection's premise would be, in effect, a flat and question-begging denial of strong representationalism, saying that the relevant representation can occur without a sensory quality occurring.
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Since I tried Ludwig back in 2017, I have been constantly using it in both editing and translation. Ever since, I suggest it to my translators at ProSciEditing.

Justyna Jupowicz-Kozak
CEO of Professional Science Editing for Scientists @ prosciediting.com