A conversation is a process that adheres to well-defined semantic conventions and is contextually grounded in domain-specific knowledge.
Every intelligible utterance relies on semantic conventions, and every utterance has a tone, even if it is a dull monotone.
Moreover, the category of conventional implicatures blurs the distinction between what is said, usually conceived as determined by the semantic conventions of language, and what is implicated, usually thought of as a matter of inference as to a speaker's intentions in saying what she does.
Core sets appear as a way to standardise sentences: this is like building an invented language, based on a shared lexicon (the codes) and syntactic and semantic conventions.
Strawson contends that rather than appealing to a series of extra-semantic conventions to account for the possibility of speech acts, we explain that possibility in terms of our ability to discern one another's communicative intentions.
So the general forms of implicature are pragmatic conventions that complement the semantic and syntactic conventions defining particular languages.
The semantic tools (dictionary, convention and role) have been fluid over the last decade and there are examples where their use is not compatible with this paper.
They keep their ears attuned to native intuitions about spelling conventions, semantic nuances, and local sensitivities.
Various theories have been proposed in answer to these questions, the most popular being that the forms of art are similar to language and are to be understood as language is understood, in terms of conventions and semantic rules.
Rather, it seems that the truth-values of statements are systematically determined, via a relatively small set of conventions, by the semantic values (relations to reality) of their simpler constituents.
