Sentence examples for Morally weighty from inspiring English sources

Stephen Sondheim and his collaborators certainly did transform the American musical comedy into "something intellectually challenging and morally weighty".

Together, the revivals at the Kennedy Center and on Broadway certify what has been apparent to musical theater aficionados for decades: that over the last 30 years, the once humble musical comedy form has been dominated and transformed by Mr. Sondheim and his collaborators into something intellectually challenging and morally weighty.

She psychologically silences considerations that are so morally weighty that they metaphysically silence the very considerations which move her to act (Garrard 1999, 55).

By contrast, transformations that could leave authority with the past self must involve a more global loss of capacity such that one can no longer generate, in any context, interests of a special, morally weighty type.

It is at least worth asking whether the interest that the secessionist group have in linking up with their ethnic comrades in S2 is morally weightier than the interest of the majority of the citizens of S1 in national security.

Admittedly, in some cases comparative judgments of whose interests are morally weightier, and hence judgments about differential treatment, can be difficult, in part due to the difficulties in knowing the capabilities of minds very different from ours and of comparing well-being across species (DeGrazia 1996).

If justice is understood in universal, rather than parochial terms, if common human solidarity counts as a weighty moral consideration, and if peace is of paramount importance and war is morally permissible only when it is just, then this kind of patriotism must be rejected.

This objection contends that there is a weighty moral duty to proportion one's beliefs to the evidence, and that this duty flows from moral personhood to be a morally responsible person requires that one have good reasons for each of one's beliefs.

In contrast, Carruthers (1989) asserts that his own arguments that nonhuman animals (even dogs) lack consciousness are sufficiently weighty that we are morally obligated to eradicate or ignore our sympathetic feelings toward such creatures.

It is both belly-crampingly hilarious and bleak, morally guided and totally fantastic, megadorable and weighty all at the same time.

These weightier interests mean that killing a paradigmatic person and thereby frustrating those interests will generally be morally worse in and of itself than killing a merely sentient animal.