The self does not actually become what it is elementally until it is awoken to its free I-hood through revelation, and until it realizes its freedom in its turning in love to the world in redemption.
The same condition applies, of course, to the other; hence, mutual recognition of rational individuals turns out to be condition necessary for the possibility of I-hood in general.
A fundamental corollary of Fichte's understanding of I-hood (Ichheit) as a kind of fact/act is his denial that the I is originally any sort of "thing" or "substance".
Since this activity of "self-positing" is taken to be the fundamental feature of I-hood in general, the first principle asserts that "the I posits itself as self-positing".
The principle in question simply states that the essence of I-hood lies in the assertion of ones own self-identity, i.e., that consciousness presupposes self-consciousness (the Kantian "I think," which must, at least in principle, be able to accompany all our representations).
I knew Hood was a terrific, innovative architect, but I had no idea he was fun and funny and cool.
I'm hood, black, you know me well, what's good, scrap?
Lucian, with whom I am exchanging frantic texts, had said the hoses from the heater would be routed into the body of the car, but now that I am under the hood I see it is loaded with hoses.
I spunked into the hood, I would lick-up the spunk and then spit it on the floor!
I tell myself, if I was really Little Red Riding Hood I would leave her door wide open.
When I go back to the hood I gotta adapt".
