Hence, if 'something' refers to a thing at time t, it cannot refer to a non-thing at different time.
The word used here for power is dunamis, but as the unmoved mover is nothing but actuality it cannot refer to an intrinsic infinite potentiality of the mover.
E.g., if Sammy is seven years old, then the sentence 'Sammy believes that snow is powdered sugar' could be true; but if this sentence is true, then (by our criterion of ontological commitment) its 'that'-clause refers to a real object; but then it cannot refer to a fact, because (obviously) there is no such thing as the fact that snow is powdered sugar.
It was assumed that a possibility refers to an actualization in the one and only world history and that it cannot refer to the present moment because of the necessity of the present understood in the Aristotelian sense formulated in (2) and (3) above.
Whatever Andrew did or didn't do with Virginia Roberts, the young woman who claims she had sex when she was a minor with Andrew (sorry, I appreciate this goes against media convention but I simply cannot refer to him as "the prince"; Andrew is nothing like the prince I was promised in Disney cartoons) is, for our purposes today, beside the point.
Hence first person present tense utterances like 'I am anxious' cannot refer to an object visible to an 'inner eye': introspection is not an inner observation.
Besides, we can define a negative constraint based on social relationship, i.e., two references that co-occur in the same hyper-edge cannot refer to the same individual.
And second, they cannot refer to any mentalese sentence token, because (i) if the first 'that'-clause refers to such a sentence, it would presumably be in Boris's head; and (ii) if the second 'that'-clause refers to such a sentence, it would presumably be in Jerry's head; and so (iii) the two 'that'-clauses cannot both refer to the same mentalese sentence token.
Like descriptivist accounts, Evans' hybrid theory accounts for cognitive significance (of the sort evidenced by sentences like (2) through (5)) as well as reference; like causal accounts, it preserves the intuition that one cannot refer to something with which one has no causal connection whatsoever.
This may have resulted simply from haste; obviously, "it" cannot refer to "posts and pictures".
